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THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE:
PRIVACY AND "GARDEN VARIETY"
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Helen A. Anderson*
INTRODUCTION
When a new patient begins a session with a social worker, psychiatrist,
or other psychotherapist, the patient is told about confidentiality. The patient
learns that, with certain limited exceptions,' the content of their discussions
will not be disclosed. If the psychotherapist is called to testify, he or she will
assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
But what if the patient decides to bring a lawsuit and seeks damages for
emotional distress? Is a request for such damages an implied waiver of the
privilege? That is, does the plaintiffs claim for emotional distress damages
entitle the defendant to examine the plaintiffs psychotherapy records in or-
der to probe the veracity of the plaintiffs assertions and investigate other
possible causes of the distress? In federal court, this issue arises primarily in
the context of discrimination claims where the defendant's right to fairly
challenge a plaintiffs evidence is pitted against the plaintiffs rights to pri-
vacy and vindication of civil rights. The issue is important because it can be
a major factor in how far plaintiffs are willing to take a case, and how willing
defendants are to settle.
Surprisingly, there is no clear authority on implied waiver of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege in federal courts. There is binding authority
from the Supreme Court establishing the privilege, but the bold outlines of
that decision have been blurred in the confusion about implied waiver. This
Article explores one aspect of that confusion: the popular "garden variety"
approach, which favors plaintiffs with what the court deems garden variety,
or "normal," mental distress. Although a few other scholars have written on
the confusion in the law of implied waiver,2 this is the first article to look
* Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I wish to thank Peter Nicolas and
Kathryn Watts for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to thank my 2011-2012
legal analysis students, whose work on a hypothetical case inspired me to follow up with this Article.
1 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20B (West 2000) (carving out an exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege where the psychotherapist determines there is a "threat of imminently
dangerous activity by the patient"); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-75-190(A)(1) (2011) (imposing a duty to report
suspected child abuse or abuse of a vulnerable adult).
2 See Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the Evisceration of the Psy-
chotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 79, 102-06 (2008); Beth S.
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closely at the garden variety approach, which is emerging as the dominant
approach. It is also the first to survey the laws of the fifty states on implied
waiver, as part of a "reason and experience" analysis under Evidence Rule
501.1 That rule states that privilege "shall be governed by the principles of
the common law" as interpreted by the federal courts "in the light of reason
and experience."
In 1996, the Court established the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
Jaffee v. Redmond.4 Using its authority under Evidence Rule 501, the Court
determined that the privilege was necessary to promote mental health treat-
ment, and that patients needed to know their conversations with their thera-
pists would remain confidential.' The Court rejected a balancing approach to
the privilege, noting that "[a]n uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no
privilege at all."6 The privilege would keep out relevant evidence, but do so
in the service of a greater public good: the "mental health of our citizenry."'
Since Jaffee, litigation has shifted from whether there is a privilege to
whether it has been waived-mostly in civil rights suits.
There is no law, in the sense of binding authority from an appellate
court, that tells lower courts how to evaluate implied waiver in most federal
jurisdictions. In several circuits there are some useful dicta but no clear hold-
ing. In most circuits, litigants are faced with trying to predict likely rulings
by looking at a wide array of district court decisions-none of which are
binding, even on the judges or magistrates who issued them. The question of
implied waiver is litigated frequently in the federal district courts, where the
magistrates and judges have come to varying conclusions. Some take a nar-
row approach, finding waiver only when the plaintiff uses a portion of privi-
leged material or puts the treating provider on the stand. Others take the broad
approach, finding waiver whenever the plaintiff seeks emotional distress
damages of any kind.
An approach gaining ground is the garden variety compromise. Under
this approach, a plaintiff does not waive the privilege simply by asking for
emotional distress damages, as long as the plaintiff claims no more than gar-
den variety emotional distress and does not introduce expert testimony or any
portion of the privileged records. This approach is a compromise because
plaintiffs are allowed to retain the privilege as long as they do not seek ex-
traordinary damages or use certain evidence.
Frank, Note, Protecting the Privacy of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege and Recovery ofEmotional Distress Damages Under the Civil Rights Act ofl991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
639, 649 (2001).
3 FED. R. EVID. 501.
4 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
5 Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
7 Id. at IL.
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But as this approach gains popularity, its problems become more appar-
ent. It is based more on considerations of relevance and fairness than on the
law of privilege and waiver. It depends on the individual judge's view of
what is "ordinary," and therefore it is unpredictable. And with its unexamined
focus on what is "ordinary" or "normal," the approach is biased and unreal-
istic. Who is the ordinary victim of a civil rights violation, and what is the
normal response? Victims of discrimination or sexual harassment will often
have prior experiences that may cause them to be particularly sensitive to
emotional distress. Repeated discrimination can cause emotional health prob-
lems.' The garden variety analysis does not take these realities into account
and is thus itself discriminatory. It tells plaintiffs that if they go beyond the
judge's view of "normal" there is something wrong with them. Only those
who are not too emotionally distressed, or who agree to fictionalize their
emotional condition, retain the privilege.
The garden variety compromise also poses problems for defendants. If
the judge finds a plaintiff s claims of emotional distress to be garden variety,
the jury is not limited to a particular garden variety monetary award. In fact,
the jury remains free to award up to the statutory limit.9 The defendant is then
vulnerable to a large award but unable to fully explore issues such as causa-
tion.
Yet the garden variety compromise remains popular. Most likely, this is
because courts are sympathetic both to defendants who need to contest claims
and to plaintiffs who want to retain some privacy in their counseling records.
Psychotherapy is increasingly common for Americans. 0 While there is less
stigma associated with seeking counseling than there was even fifteen years
ago when Jaffee was decided, people are still concerned about privacy.
Courts are sympathetic to these privacy concerns, but they are also sympa-
thetic to defendants' arguments about fairness and causation. A plaintiffs
psychotherapy can conjure up competing pictures. One image is that of an
injured person earnestly seeking help with recovery; the other is of a truly
mentally disturbed and troublesome person hiding his condition behind the
therapist's office walls. Courts want to protect the former but not the latter.
The garden variety approach does not square with the law of privilege. How-
ever, until a clear court rule, statute, or Supreme Court holding emerges, it is
likely to continue attracting many district courts sympathetic to the compet-
ing fairness and privacy concerns it addresses.
This Article is the first to critique the garden variety approach in detail
and its special problems in civil rights litigation. It is also the first to analyze
waiver under the template of Jaffee. A close reading of Jaffee suggests that a
proper approach to implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
should follow the Court's "reason and experience" analysis under Federal
8 See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
9 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(3) (2006). See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Part I.B.2.
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Rule of Evidence 501. Such an analysis involves identifying the important
public good served by the privilege, examining the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee's work" on the proposed and enacted Federal Rules of
Evidence, and looking to the experience of the states. When this approach is
followed for the question of implied waiver of the privilege, we can see
that-in addition to the public good of the "mental health of our citi-
zenry"l 2-waiver implicates the important federal policy of vindicating civil
rights. But the lessons to be taken from the Advisory Committee's work and
the laws of the states are mixed, illustrating the continuing tension between
plaintiffs' privacy rights and defendants' rights to relevant evidence.
A better solution to the dilemma of analyzing implied waiver might be
a statutory one, outside the current legal framework of privilege and waiver.
A statutory amendment could allow federal civil rights plaintiffs a choice:
receive moderate damages in a sum certain that is less than the current max-
imum, or waive the privilege and seek actual damages (up to the statutory
cap"). In a sense, this would be the garden variety compromise, but in a stat-
utory form and under the plaintiff s control. There is common law precedent
for a choice of moderate damages when proof of actual damages is trouble-
some,14 although such a fix to federal law would of course have to be accom-
plished by legislative amendment. It is useful to think about such an amend-
ment because it would address the legitimate concerns that have led to the
garden variety approach and would give control of the waiver back to the
plaintiff-patient. At present, neither plaintiff nor defendant can predict when
the court will find waiver. The judicial garden variety approach does nothing
to reduce that uncertainty; a statutory version could do so by giving the plain-
tiff-patient a choice.
This Article traces the development of the garden variety approach to
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal court, critiques that
approach, and suggests an alternative. Part I begins with the history of the
Supreme Court's adoption of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. It also
looks at the context for the implied waiver issue-namely, the civil rights
legislation under which the issue usually arises and the changing patterns of
mental health treatment which make the issue so common. Part I concludes
with a look at the federal court decisions on implied waiver, explaining the
lack of clear authority and the three general approaches that have emerged,
with emphasis on the dominant garden variety approach.
11 The Evidence Advisory Committee is one of five advisory committees to the Federal Judicial
Conference. These committees assist in the Court's rulemaking process by evaluating and drafting pro-
posed rules for the Judicial Conference to consider. See How the Rulemaking Process Works,
UsCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rulcmaking-
process-works.aspx (last visited Sept. I1, 2013).
12 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1l.
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006).
14 See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text
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Next, Part II presents an alternative analysis to what the courts have so
far provided. This section discusses how the garden variety approach, despite
its compromise appeal, undermines the goals of civil rights legislation, rein-
forces outmoded bias against mental health treatment, and does nothing to
lessen uncertainty for litigants. Part II then follows the "reason and experi-
ence" template laid out in Jaffee to determine the best approach to implied
waiver in civil rights cases. That template suggests that we first determine
the important public good involved and then consult sources such as the Ad-
visory Committee proposals and notes and the laws of the states. However,
this Article concludes that such an analysis-although illuminating-leads
to no clear answer, other than to suggest the propriety of legislation.
Finally, Part III suggests a possible legislative fix: allow civil rights
plaintiffs to seek moderate damages in a sum certain, rather than actual dam-
ages, and maintain their psychotherapist-patient privilege. This proposal is
limited to civil rights plaintiffs, whose cases implicate the additional public
good of federal civil rights policy. Although a more general federal statute or
court rule on waiver of the privilege may be desirable, this Article is con-
cerned with the particular issues raised in civil rights litigation."
I. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AND IMPLIED WAIVER
A. The Supreme Court Establishes the Privilege
In 1996, the Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege as a matter of federal common law in Jaffee v. Redmond. The Court
did so under the authority of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which authorizes
the federal courts to define new privileges by interpreting common law prin-
ciples "in the light of reason and experience."16
15 As noted, the bulk of the federal decisions on the implied waiver issue are in civil rights cases.
16 When Jaffee was decided, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provided:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the priv-
ilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1975) (amended 2011). Stylistic
revisions to the evidence rules were enacted in 2011 but did not affect the substance.
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At the time of Jaffee, the Court had already recognized an attorney-cli-
ent privilege' 7-long-established in common law-and the spousal privi-
lege.II As the Court had explained,
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence." As such, they must be strictly construed and
accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding rcle-
vant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing
all rational means for ascertaining truth.""
Proponents of the privilege could not have asked for better facts than
those presented in Jaffee. The party asserting the privilege was a police of-
ficer and defendant in a civil suit who had sought counseling after a traumatic
event.2 0 As the Court put it:
After a traumatic incident in which she shot and killed a man, a police officer received exten-
sive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker. The question we address is whether
statements the officer made to her therapist during the counseling sessions are protected from
compelled disclosure in a federal civil action brought by the family of the deceased.2'
Under these facts, the Court reasoned that the privilege was necessary
to promote the confidentiality necessary for effective mental health treat-
ment.22 The privilege promoted a social good by "facilitating the provision of
appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emo-
tional problem. The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical
health, is a public good of transcendent importance." 23 The Court asserted the
importance of confidentiality to effective treatment and rejected a balancing
approach to the privilege.2 4 Patients and their therapists required certainty,
the Court said, in order to engage in therapy without the inhibiting fear of
future disclosure. 25 "[Tihe mere possibility of disclosure may impede devel-
opment of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment." 26
The Court recognized that privileges by their nature exclude relevant
evidence but do so in favor of a competing public policy. 27 The Court relied
17 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
18 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980) (recognizing marital communication priv-
ilege but limiting adverse spousal testimony privilege).
19 Id at 50 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1996).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 10.
23 Id. at I1.
24 Id. at 17.
25 Id. at 10.
26 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
27 Id. at 9.
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on analogies to the attorney-client privilege, citing its decision in Upjohn Co.
v. United States,28 which said the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is
to "encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their cli-
ents and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice."29 The work of both attorneys and psychother-
apists depends on confidentiality.30 The Court also found support for its pol-
icy analysis in the Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 504, discussed below, and in the fact that all fifty states had adopted
some form of the psychotherapist privilege.31
The Court rejected any balancing of competing interests in determining
whether to apply the privilege. "Making the promise of confidentiality con-
tingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the
patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would
eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."32 The Court did not further de-
fine the scope of the privilege, nor did it describe how the privilege might be
waived. However, in two footnotes the Court acknowledged the possibility
of limitations and waiver. In footnote 19, the Court said, "[W]e do not doubt
that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if
a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by
means of a disclosure by the therapist."33 In footnote 14, the Court merely
stated, "Like [sic] other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course
waive the protection."3 4
Jaffee was not the Court's first attempt to establish a psychotherapist
privilege. Twenty-five years earlier, the Court had recommended to Congress
that it enact a psychotherapist-patient privilege as part of the proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.3 Congress rejected the enumeration of specific priv-
ileges, including Proposed Rule 504 (Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege), in
favor of the common law authority in Rule 501. However, the Jaffee court
quoted approvingly from the Advisory Committee Notes in support of Pro-
posed Rule 504, noting that Congress had not actually disapproved of the
privilege or the reasoning of the Advisory Committee. 6 The Court cited the
28 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
29 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at II (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 The public good served by the other privilege referenced in Jaffee, the marital privilege, is dif-
ferent. It is to preserve marital harmony, rather than to encourage full and frank communication between
spouses. Id See generally Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-51 (1980) (discussing marital priv-
ilege and adverse spousal testimony privilege).
31 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, 12; see infra Part II.B.2.
32 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.
33 Id at 18 n. 19.
34 Id. at 15 n. 14.
35 Id. at 10.
36 As justification for this reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes, the Court stated: "In rejecting
the proposed draft that had specifically identified each privilege rule and substituting the present more
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Advisory Committee's emphasis on the importance of confidentiality to psy-
chotherapy: "[Tlhere is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non
for successful psychiatric treatment."37
Although the Court relied on the proposed rule, one part of that proposal
went unmentioned. The Proposed Rule 504 contained an exception that goes
to the issue of implied waiver:
There is no privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental
or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relics upon the condition
as an clement of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which
any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense."
This is the so-called patient-litigant exception." The Jaffee Court did
not refer to this subsection, but subsequent courts have picked up on its lan-
guage in addressing implied waiver.4 0 The question for many courts has thus
been framed as whether the plaintiff has put his or her "mental or emotional
condition at issue." 41
This patient-litigant exception can be at odds with analogies to the at-
torney-client privilege, and this conflict may have contributed to the analyti-
cal confusion about waiver. Asking whether the patient's mental condition is
at issue is a very different question from that asked in the context of deter-
mining waiver of the attorney-client privilege: whether the client has put the
representation-not he topic of representation-at issue. 42 The attorney-cli-
ent privilege protects communications about topics that are very relevant to
the litigation, and the client-litigant does not waive the privilege with respect
to discussion of elements of his or her claim even though these elements are
open-ended Rule 501, the Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that its action 'should not be un-
derstood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient . . . privileg[c] contained in the [pro-
posed] rules."' Id. at 15 (alterations in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7059 (1974)).
37 Id at 10 (quoting Proposed Federal Rules of Evidenec 504 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D.
183, 242 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1973).
3 "The patient-litigant exception included in Proposed Rule 504 represents the prevailing rule in
the states and has been recognized as part of the federal common-law psychotherapist-patient privilege."
Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1375 (1998) (footnote omitted). See infra Part II.B.3 for a discus-
sion of the various state interpretations of this exception.
40 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 565 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
41 See, e.g., id at 563 (quoting Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal.),
modiied, Doe, 196 F.R.D. 562 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Doc v. Oberweis
Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006) ("If a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress places
his or her psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled to discover any records of that state.");
Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiff placed her "medical condi-
tion at issue").
42 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note (discussing common-law waiver doctrines for
attorney client privilege).
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certainly at issue. The client does forfeit the privilege,43 however, if the client
seeks to rely on counsel's advice as a defense, or if the client sues the attorney
for malpractice, thereby putting the substance of the communications at is-
sue.44 By analogy, a patient would not waive the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege simply by putting his or her mental condition at issue, but rather only if
she put the treatment itself at issue in some way. Disagreement about this
analogy between the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges-
especially in light of the patient-litigant exception-is one reason for the dif-
ferences among the various approaches to waiver of the latter privilege in the
federal courts.45
B. Context for Implied Waiver of the Privilege
The issue of implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
arises most frequently in the context of civil rights litigation, and against a
changing backdrop of mental health treatment. A brief look at this context is
helpful for an understanding of the waiver issue.
1. Federal Civil Rights Legislation
In federal court, the issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege has arisen not so much in cases like Jaffee, where a civil defendant
claimed the privilege, but most often in civil rights suits by plaintiffs making
claims under federal laws such as Title VII,46 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,
or the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").47 In these cases, plaintiffs
seeking emotional distress damages assert the psychotherapist-patient pnvi-
lege in response to defense discovery requests. Most of the reported cases
43 Forfeiture may be the more appropriate term for what the courts have called waiver or implied
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Smith, supra note 2, at 102-06 (discussing the differ-
ence between intentional, affirmative acts of waiver and the concepts of exceptions or limitations to the
privilege). See also 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5543 (1989) (discussing distortion of the waiver concept with respect to patient-litigants).
4 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note.
45 Although Jaffee analogized the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the attorney-client privilege,
courts are clearly more protective of the latter. The attomey-client privilege is, after all, part of the legal
framework, itself in service of the machinery of litigation. Judges were all lawyers at one time and there-
fore more understanding of the need for lawyer confidentiality. "The [attorney-client] privilege recognizes
that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer's being fully informed by the client." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
Special solicitude for the attorney-client privilege is also evidenced in the 2008 enactment of Federal Rule
of Evidence 502, Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver. Rule 502 tightens
the requirements for waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17(2006).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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involve claims of employment discrimination, but the implied waiver issue
also arises in housing discrimination cases 48 and prisoners' lawsuits. 49 Federal
civil rights legislation includes statutes relating to freedom of contract, hous-
ing, public accommodation, employment, and more. 0
Compensatory damages for pain, suffering, and mental distress are often
a major-if not the only-part of the damages sought.' The original Civil
Rights Act of 1964 did not allow for compensatory damages.5 2 In 1991, Con-
gress amended the law to allow such damages." As the House Report stated:
Victims of intentional sexual or religious discrimination in employment terms and conditions
often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering. This distress often manifests itself in
emotional disorders and medical problems. Victims of discrimination often suffer substantial
out-of-pocket expenses as a result of the discrimination, none of which is compensable with
equitable remedies. The limitation of relief under Title VII to equitable remedies often means
that victims of intentional discrimination may not recover for the very real effects of the dis-
crimination. Thus, victims of intentional discrimination are discouraged from seeking to vin-
dicate their civil rights.'
Damages for emotional distress are particularly important in claims
based on a "hostile work environment" or sexual harassment, where the
plaintiff can bring suit regardless of whether she lost tangible job benefits."
In such cases, emotional distress damages may be the only damages available
to a plaintiff.16 Congress has limited such damages in employment discrimi-
nation actions to $300,000 for the largest employers and $50,000 for the
48 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 632 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
49 See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2008); Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 220
(N.D. Ill. 2011).
50 The civil rights laws include not only the Reconstruction-cra civil rights statutes, now codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1982, and 1983, but also the Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(2006); Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006); and Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a- I 975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (2006).
51 Frank, supra note 2, at 647.
52 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 262 (1964).
53 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b) (2006).
54 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 25 (1991).
55 See generally Frank, supra note 2, at 644-48.
56 See, e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (applying the broad rule in part because emotional distress damages are the only damages
sought for sexual harassment).
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smallest." These provisions for compensatory damages also apply to claims
of intentional discrimination under the ADA."
2. Psychotherapy and Mental Health Treatment
At the time of the 1996 Jaffee decision, psychotherapy was becoming
increasingly important to Americans. Legislatures in all fifty states had by
then recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege by statute. 9 The court of
appeals in Jaffee had noted a rapid rise in counseling, stating, "[m]uch has
changed with the mental health field in the past five years. The need, and
demand, for counseling services has skyrocketed . . . "60
Mental health treatment has continued to grow, and there is less stigma
associated with such treatment than there used to be. "Psychotherapy has be-
come mainstream."6' Many Americans seek counseling, although most seek
it from licensed social workers, therapists, or pastoral counselors rather than
more expensive psychologists or psychiatrists. 6 2 An increasing number of
students seek mental health treatment at college, and many come to college
already under treatment.63 A trend begun by the time of Jaffee has contin-
ued-the increased use of medication to treat even mild mental health prob-
lems. During the past two decades, much outpatient mental health treatment
57 The law provides:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecu-
niary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this
section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more cal-
endar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2006).
58 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(a)(2) (2006).
59 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6 (1996).
60 Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted), af'd, 518 U.S. 1
(1996).
61 JONATHAN ENGEL, AMERICAN THERAPY: THE RISE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY IN THE UNITED STATES
260 (2008).
62 Id. at xi. See also Daniel Carlat, Mind Over Meds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.ny
times.com/2010/04/25/magazine/25Memoir-t.html?pagcwanted=all; Gardiner Harris, Talk Doesn't Pay,
So Psychiatry Turns Instead to Drug Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/06/health/policy/06doctors.html?pagewantcd=all (describing a trend toward pharmacological
treatment in psychiatry, and the insurance coverage incentives to have lower paid professionals, rather
than psychiatrists, provide talk therapy).
63 Trip Gabriel, Mental Health Needs Seen Growing at Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/health/20campus.html?pagewanted=all.
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has been accomplished through psychotropic medication rather than talk
therapy." The increase in medication has, however, also pushed many people
into psychotherapy who might not otherwise have sought it,65 as emotional
and mental problems are seen as treatable illness rather than character flaws
or intractable traits. In addition, even patients who receive only medication
will have some privileged communications with their providers to allow for
a diagnosis and monitoring.
Insurance coverage for mental health treatment, including psychother-
apy, is much more common now and likely to spread with the implementa-
tion of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA").66 It is stated federal policy to make
mental health treatment available to those who need it, without stigma.6 1
More Americans will have insurance coverage for mental health treatment,
but insurance companies usually require a diagnosis before they will approve
reimbursement. Thus, with increased mental health coverage will come an
increase in diagnoses.68 The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual69 provides hundreds of disorders for therapists to
choose from. The Manual includes diagnoses for moderate transitory condi-
tions, "adjustment disorders" and insomnia,7 0 as well as more serious and
long-lasting conditions.
3. Several Approaches to Implied Waiver
Against this backdrop of expanding mental health treatment, the courts
have wrestled with the implied waiver issue. The Jaffee Court noted that the
privilege could be waived but said no more on the subject.7' The lower courts
have been left to work it out, and have done so largely free of binding au-
thority.
6 Mark Olfson & Steven C. Marcus, National Trends in Outpatient Psychotherapy, 167 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1456, 1456 (2010).
65 ENGEL, supra note 61, at 260.
66 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). See
Richard A. Friedman, Good News for Mental Illness in Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/hcalth/policy/health-care-law-offers-widcr-benefits-for-treating-
mental-illncss.html (pointing out that although the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
had not led to more widespread mental health coverage, the Affordable Care Act of 2010 would eventually
lead to "near-universal" mental health coverage).
67 See The Federal Mental Health Action Agenda, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, http://www.samhsa.gov/federalactionagenda/NFC FMHAA.aspx (last visited Sept. I1, 2013)
(stating the goals for a "transformed mental health system" from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration).
68 See Smith, supra note 2, at I 13.
69 The fifth edition was released in May 2013.
70 Smith, supra note 2, at 13 n.208.
71 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996).
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When plaintiffs seek emotional distress damages in civil rights litiga-
tion, defendants may argue that by seeking such damages, or by introducing
certain evidence in support of such damages, plaintiffs have impliedly
waived the privilege for their psychotherapy records. At least three ap-
proaches have emerged in response to these arguments: the so-called
"broad," "narrow," and "middle" r garden variety-approaches. Although
the approaches can be neatly delineated in theory, the terms lose their clarity
in court decisions. Broad rules are stated in cases involving garden variety
damages; narrow rules are stated in cases where waiver could be denied un-
der the broad rule; and there is no consensus as to the genus or species of the
garden variety damages. 72
The broad approach seemed to dominate the field shortly after Jaffee.7 1
Under the broad view of waiver, the plaintiff impliedly waives the privilege
if she seeks emotional distress damages of any kind or degree. 74 Under this
view, plaintiffs can avoid waiver only by not asking for mental distress dam-
ages or asserting any psychological harm.
The narrow view is modeled after the law of attorney-client privilege.
Under this view, implied waiver results only if the plaintiff attempts to rely
on part of the communications with the psychotherapist or calls the treatment
provider as a witness.7 1 Some courts will widen this view slightly to find
waiver if the plaintiff introduces any expert testimony in support of a claim
of emotional distress damages. 76
The garden variety, or middle-ground, approach strikes a balance be-
tween broad and narrow. Under this approach, the plaintiff does not waive
the privilege so long as she does not seek damages for more than garden va-
riety emotional distress and does not introduce expert testimony or a diagno-
sis in support of her claim.77 There is great variation in what courts consider
to be garden variety damages.78 Generally, they are "the distress that any
72 See, e.g., Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 449 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)
(discussing "broad rule" cases that involve more than garden variety claims); In re Consol. RNC Cases,
2009 WL 130178, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (applying the garden variety rule to find waiver in a wide
range of mental distress damage claims).
7 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 569 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Sarko v. Penn-Del
Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
74 Although this is the broad rule formulation, many cases that state such a rule contain facts that
would support waiver even under the other approaches-few cases find waiver merely on a prayer for
ordinary mental distress damages attached to a civil rights claim. See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 448-50
(discussing cases).
75 See Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (adopting the narrow view).
76 Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 WL 2711534, at *5 (E.D.
Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (characterizing this approach as the third of four approaches).
77 See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 449-50.
78 See Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing various formulations of
garden variety emotional damages).
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healthy, well-adjusted person would likely feel as a result of being so victim-
ized."79
a. Little Guidance from the Courts ofAppeals
The district courts, which routinely deal with discovery issues, have lit-
tle guidance from the courts of appeals on the issue of implied waiver. Of the
five federal appellate decisions addressing waiver of the psychotherapist
privilege, three contain what can be characterized as language in favor of the
broad rule, while two take a narrower approach.s0 But the facts of all of these
cases can be distinguished in ways that have allowed the lower courts almost
free rein in determining waiver. Most of what the appellate courts have said
about implied waiver can be characterized as dicta.
It was not until 2000 that the first federal appellate decision citing Jaffee
came down on the issue of waiver, and it seemed to favor the broad ap-
proach." In Schoffstall v. Henderson,82 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's finding of waiver where an employee sought emo-
tional distress damages for sex discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harass-
ment." Citing several district court decisions espousing the broad rule, the
court stated: "Numerous courts since Jaffee have concluded that, similar to
attorney-client privilege that can be waived when the client places the attor-
ney's representation at issue, a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient
privilege by placing his or her medical condition at issue."" The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had put her medical condition at issue,5 although it
did not explain exactly how she had done so. Presumably it was because of
her allegations of extreme emotional distress: "Although her claims are dif-
ficult to decipher and interspersed with allegations of extreme emotional dis-
tress, they apparently boil down to sex discrimination, retaliation, and sexual
harassment."' 6 Despite the cursory analysis, and the seemingly broad lan-
guage, district courts in the Eighth Circuit have read the decision to support
a middle ground, garden variety approach.87
7 Id. (quoting Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIVl 145(RWS)(MHD), 2006 WL 2516625,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80 See infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text.
81 Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000).
82 223 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2000).
83 Id at 823.
84 Id
85 Id
86 Id at 822.
8 See, e.g., Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 WL 2711534, at
*5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (finding the plaintiffs did not waive the privilege when seeking damages
for garden variety "humiliation, embarrassment, [and] emotional distress" (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Walker v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. Civ.00-2604 MJD/JGL, 2002 WL
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In 2006, the Seventh Circuit issued a similarly cursory decision on
waiver, also with very broad language. The plaintiff in Doe v. Oberweis
Dairy" brought claims of employment discrimination, as well as battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.89 Referring to the "closely related
doctor-patient privilege,"" the court stated:
If a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress places his or her psychological state in
issue, the defendant is entitled to discover any records of that state. Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would entitle the defendant to demand that the plaintiff submit to a
psychiatric examination, the results of which would be available for use by the defendant in
discovery and at trial; there is no greater invasion of privacy by making existing records avail-
able to the defendant.9 '
The court's premises are faulty. Jaffee analogized to the attorney-client
privilege,92 and the Court has not recognized a doctor-patient privilege.3
Moreover, it is questionable whether it is a greater invasion of privacy to
undergo an exam than to have one's past records combed through. And de-
spite Doe's broad language, district courts in the Seventh Circuit have felt
free to endorse the garden variety approach.94
In fact, the outcomes in both Schoffstall and Doe can be squared with
the garden variety--or even a narrow-approach to waiver. In Schoffstall,
the plaintiff alleged "severe" rather than ordinary emotional distress.95 In
Doe, the plaintiff had a separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional
32539635, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2002) ("If, on the other hand, Plaintiff intends to seek anything more
than nominal damages for any alleged emotional distress, then he is placing his mental condition at issue
in this case, and Northwest is entitled to explore any evidence, including Plaintiffs medical records, which
may be relevant to such a claim.").
8 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006).
'9 Id. at 707.
90 Id. at 718. The court provided no citation for this reference. There is no federal doctor-patient
privilege, nor was a physician-patient privilege proposed as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183,242 (1973) (explaining
that "the common law recognized no general physician-patient privilege"). The proposed rules included
an attorney-client privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, husband-wife privilege, and a privilege for
"communications to clergymen." Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 503-06, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-47
(1973).
91 Doe, 456 F.3d at 718 (citations omitted).
92 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
93 See supra note 90.
94 See, e.g., Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 226 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (taking the garden variety
approach to waiver). See also Kroncnberg v. Baker & McKenzie LLP, 747 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994 (N.D.
Ill. 2010) (applying the garden variety approach); Loch v. Bd. of Educ. of Edwardsville Cmty. Sch. Dist.
#7, Civil No. 06-017-MJR, 2007 WL 3037285, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2007) (stating in dicta, "This court
doubts whether every plaintiff who seeks recovery for generalized emotional distress necessarily waives
the psychotherapist/patient privilege as to his complete mental health history in every case").
95 Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 826 (8th Cir. 2000).
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distress.96 These facts are among those considered by courts to put a claim of
distress beyond the garden variety.97 There is no denying that the language in
both decisions seems to endorse a broad approach to waiver of the privilege,
yet neither case established a binding rule for the lower courts.
In an age discrimination case, the Sixth Circuit also issued a decision
with broad language.98 In Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw,99 the plain-
tiff appealed the admission of records of her sessions with a social worker.'0
The plaintiff herself had initially introduced some of these records-a poten-
tially important fact, but one not relied upon by the court.o'0 The court af-
firmed, noting, "To be sure, if [the plaintiff] were not seeking emotional-
distress damages, then her conversations with a social worker about how she
was feeling would likely be privileged. But when [the plaintiff] put her emo-
tional state at issue in the case, she waived any such privilege . . . ."102 The
court's language suggests that any request for emotional distress damages
waives the privilege. A subsequent, unpublished Sixth Circuit decision reads
Maday to endorse the broad rule, 03 as does a district court decision. '1" Thus,
in the Sixth Circuit, the broad rule seems to prevail. 0
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit favored the narrow approach when it ad-
dressed the waiver issue in 2007. Just as in Doe and Schoffstall, however,
much of the court's reasoning is dicta, as it goes beyond what was necessary
to resolve the case. In Koch v. Cox, 0 6 the defendant employer argued that the
plaintiff placed his mental state in issue, and thereby waived the privilege,
when he admitted in deposition that he was depressed and referred to "stress"
and "humiliation."107 The plaintiff had not sought emotional distress damages
(or had abandoned any such claim).10 Yet the defendant sought to use the
plaintiffs admissions as an implied waiver. Reviewing the narrow, broad,
and middle-ground approaches that had grown up in the district courts, as
well as the Schoffstall and Doe decisions, the court held:
96 Doe, 456 F.3d at 707.
97 See infra Part 1.B.3.c.
98 Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 817 (6th Cir. 2007).
99 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007).
100 Id. at 820.
101 Id
102 Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
103 See Simon v. Cook, 261 F. App'x 873, 886 (6th Cir. 2008).
104 Dubose v. City of Morristown, No. 2:07-CV- 115, 2012 WL 876813, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 12,
2012).
105 But see Lamb v. Hazel, No. 5:12-CV-00070-TBR, 2013 WL 1411239, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 8,
2013) (concluding that the garden variety approach is the rule in the Sixth Circuit).
106 489 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
107 Id at 387.
108 Id at 386.
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[A] plaintiff does not put his mental state in issue merely by acknowledging he suffers from
depression, for which he is not seeking recompense; nor may a defendant overcome the privi-
lege by putting the plaintiffs mental state in issue. A plaintiff who makes no claim for recovery
based upon injury to his mental or emotional state puts that state in issue and thereby waives
the psychotherapist-patient privilege when, consistent with the Supreme Court's analogy in
Jaffee, he does the sort of thing that would waive the attorney-client privilege, such as basing
his claim upon the psychotherapist's communications with him; or, as with the marital privi-
lege, "selectively disclos[ing] part of a privileged communication in order to gain an advantage
in litigation.""
The Koch court stated that the Schoffstall court had not properly analo-
gized to the attorney-client privilege. 0 A client does not waive the attorney-
client privilege simply by putting a matter at issue that was the subject of the
representation."' A proper analogy would lead to finding waiver when the
patient put the communications with the psychotherapist or the treatment in
issue, not simply when the patient put his emotional state at issue. II2 Thus,
the Koch court contains a strong argument for the narrow view. Yet a district
court in its jurisdiction found that Koch had not held that one approach was
best-only that waiver had not occurred in that case." The district court then
applied the garden variety test adopted by the Second Circuit.I 4
The Second Circuit is the most recent to weigh in, and like the D.C.
Circuit, it rejected the broad view."' In In re Sims,"6 the court held that a
prisoner suing for civil rights violations did not waive his psychotherapist
privilege merely by stating in a deposition that he had anxiety and depression,
especially when he had no attorney at the time.' The prisoner had since
dropped his emotional distress damage claims and stipulated he would not
call a treatment provider or expert.'' Noting that implied waiver is best de-
termined on a case-by-case basis under considerations of fairness, the court
stated that a party might waive the privilege by disclosing or introducing
some privileged material, but not simply by taking a position that the evi-
dence might contradict.' 'l The court also found that the presence or absence
of counsel was relevant to the inquiry.120 The Sims court soundly rejected the
broad view that any claim for mental or emotional injury waives the pnivi-
109 Id. at 391 (citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
I10 Id. at 389.
11 Id.
112 Koch, 489 F.3d at 389.
113 St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2011).
114 Id. at 20. Of course, since the court found no waiver under that test, its holding was not contrary
to the Koch decision.
115 In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 134 (2d Cir. 2008).
116 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008).
117 Id at 134.
118 Id at 133.
'19 Idat132.
120 Id at 133.
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lege, or that waiver results whenever psychotherapeutic records might be rel-
evant to a plaintiffs claim.12 ' Its multi-factored "fairness" approach seems
most consistent with the middle-ground or garden variety view of waiver.122
Thus, with the possible exception of the Sixth Circuit in Maday, the
courts of appeals that have touched on the waiver issue have not set binding
rules for the district courts confronted with discovery motions. Despite the
discussions of the three approaches, and language that seems to favor one or
the other approach, there is little in the way of guidance-and certainly no
predictability. Of course, district courts in the majority of circuits, which
have not addressed the issue at the appellate level, are completely free to
choose their rule for waiver. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, district courts
have taken broad, narrow, and garden variety approaches. 23
Further real guidance is unlikely. Although the issue of waiver arises
frequently in the district courts, if one goes by the number of district court
orders addressing it, the issue rarely appears in appellate decisions, let alone
published decisions. This may be due to high settlement rates. 124 Thus the
district courts are left to hash out the issue on their own. The result is a great
deal of uncertainty, although the majority of the lower courts seem to be con-
verging on the middle-ground, or garden variety, approach.
121 Id. at 141.
122 District courts in New York appear to have read the case to approve the garden variety rule. See,
e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114, 121 (W.D.N.Y 2009)
(finding no waiver where claimed damages were only for "pain, suffering and humiliation" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); In re Consol. RNC Cases, 2009 WL 130178, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (finding
waiver where plaintiffs had claimed negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as "numerous and
specific" emotional distress damages).
123 Examples of courts adopting the broad view can be found in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400 (E.D. Cal. 2009), and Doe v. City
of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1999). By contrast, courts adopted the narrow view in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 637, 641 (E.D. Wash.
2011), and Fitzgeraldv. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In another case, Sims v. Lakeside
School, No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 5417731, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2007), the court took an
ostensibly narrow approach, although applied to garden variety facts. In Haught v. City ofAnderson, No.
2:1 1-CV-1653-JAM-CMK, 2013 WL 210066, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013), the court applied the
garden variety rule.
124 The rarity of the discovery issue's appearance in the appellate courts may also be due to the often
deferential standard of review. The first appeal is often of the magistrate's order to the district court judge.
In Batts v. County ofSanta Clara, No. C 08-00286 JW, 2009 WL 3732003 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009), the
judge upheld the magistrate's order applying the narrow approach under the reasoning that since the Ninth
Circuit had not addressed the issue of waiver, the magistrate's choice of rule could not be "contrary to
law." Such reasoning, if widely adopted, could create a "Catch-22" where the issue could never get past
the standard of review and thus never reach the Court of Appeals. Not all courts apply the standard of
review in this way, however. See, e.g., Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 565-68 (reversing the magistrate's application
of the narrow view and applying the broad view to waiver).
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b. District Court Decisions: Broad and Narrow
District courts police discovery by ruling on motions. Civil rights plain-
tiffs generally assert the privilege in response to a defendant's discovery re-
quest. The issue is then addressed by the court in a ruling on a motion to
compel disclosure.125 The issue may also arise through a plaintiff s motion to
quash the defendant's subpoena of psychotherapeutic records,126 or a plain-
tiff's motion for a protective order. These rulings are written by magistrates
and district court judges and are generally available whether officially pub-
lished or not.
District courts began to grapple with the question of implied waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege shortly after the Jaffee decision. At first,
the broad view of waiver seemed to prevail, so that the Schoffstall court in
2000 could state that "numerous cases" supported its broad view.127 A con-
trary, narrow view emerged early on, however, as did the garden variety ap-
proach. Some courts, especially more recently, will state a preference for the
narrow approach but use reasoning more consistent with a middle-ground or
garden variety approach.128 By 2011, an Illinois federal magistrate judge con-
cluded that a "numerical minority" held the broad view,129 and that "most
courts have held that claims of 'garden variety' emotional damage do not
result in a waiver of the psychotherapist/patient privilege."3 0 The arguments
in favor and against each approach have been well articulated in a number of
decisions.
Arguments for the broad approach rely mainly on the need for "fairness"
to defendants, who should be allowed to challenge the causation of emotional
distress. The seminal decision favoring the broad approach is Sarko v. Penn-
Del Directory Co. 'I' The Sarko court held that a plaintiff who claimed viola-
tion of the ADA when she was fired for tardiness had waived the privilege
125 See, e.g., Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 WL 2711534, at
*5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (denying defendant's motion to compel production of psychiatric records).
126 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 633 (granting plaintiffs motion to quash a subpoena of psy-
chiatric records).
127 Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Ryan M. Gott, Note, The
Evolving Treatment of "Garden Variety" Claims Under the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 6 Suffolk
J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 91, 97 (2001) ("The majority of cases follow the Sarko [broad view] philoso-
phy.").
128 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 276 F.R.D. at 641 (taking the narrow approach but stating that if
defendant discovers evidence of "more particularized mental health or physical health issues, or that there
were other potential causes or a long history of a relevant mental or physical illness, then Defendant may
reapply to the Court for an order compelling production of medical records"). See also Sims, 2007 WL
5417731, at *I (applying the "narrow approach" but noting "garden variety" claims (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
129 Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 223 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
130 Id. at 225.
131 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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because she claimed to be disabled by depression. 32 The court analogized to
the attorney-client privilege, citing Jaffee: "the Supreme Court specifically
analogized the policy considerations supporting recognition of the privilege
in Jaffee to those underlying the attorney-client privilege, which is waived
when the advice of counsel is placed at issue in litigation.""' The court also
found that it "would simply be contrary to the most basic sense of fairness
and justice" to allow the plaintiff to claim privilege when her mental condi-
tion is directly at issue.13 4 It is worth noting that the Sarko plaintiff had the
burden not only to show emotional distress damages, but also a mental disa-
bility of depression.
Later decisions amplify the theme of fairness. In Doe v. City of Chula
Vista,13 5 the court concluded,
[T]o insure a fair trial, particularly on the element of causation . . . defendants should have
access to evidence that [plaintiffs] emotional state was caused by something else. . . . Once
[plaintiff] has elected to seek such damages, she cannot fairly prevent discovery into evidence
relating to the element of her claim."'
The Doe court also relied on the Supreme Court's proposed, but re-
jected, evidence rule that would have codified the psychotherapist-patient
privilege with an exception for when the patient had put his or her mental
condition at issue. 3 7 The possibility of "multiple causation"'38 and fairness
concerns" have been cited by other courts in favor of the broad view. "The
parlance often employed in the cases is that one cannot use a privilege as
both a sword and a shield." 4 0
Courts persuaded by the narrow view, on the other hand, find fairness
to the defendant less compelling than the privacy interests protected by the
privilege. In 1997, a Massachusetts federal judge took issue with the then
dominant broad view, in particular the arguments set forth by the Sarko court.
132 Id. at 129-30.
133 Id. at 130.
134 Id (quoting Premack v. J.C.J. Ogar, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 140, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
136 Id at 569. Although the court found implied waiver, it limited the scope of that waiver and or-
dered in camera review of the records by a magistrate to ensure only relevant material was released.
137 Id. at 568.
138 Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400 (E.D.
Cal. 2009).
139 Id.; see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no waiver but noting fairness
concerns).
140 Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 132; Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188
F.R.D. 306, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1999); 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (2d ed. 2005).
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In Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark,141 the court criticized the way in which
the Sarko court had analogized to the attorney-client privilege. It reasoned
that the privilege is waived only if the communication itself is put in issue,
not simply because the topic of the communication is at issue; "[t]he act of
seeking damages for emotional distress is analogous to seeking attorney's
fees. The fact that a privileged communication has taken place may be rele-
vant. But, the fact that a communication has taken place does not necessarily
put [its] content at issue." 42
Narrow view courts also rebuffed arguments that fairness to the defense
required the broad approach. A California federal court noted that a privilege
is meant to exclude relevant evidence "in order to serve interests that are of
over-arching importance."l 43 The Jaffee Court's insistence that the privilege
be clear, and not be dependent on after-the-fact judicial balancing, gave the
court another reason to reject the broad or garden variety approaches.'4 This
court also noted a substantial potential for abuse under the broad view of
waiver because it would give defendants unfettered access to medical and
psychiatric records.145 Finally, the court emphasized that defendants were free
to inquire about the "occurrence and dates of any psychotherapy," topics that
were not privileged.146 Defendants were also free to find other evidence to
support a theory that the plaintiffs distress was exaggerated or pre-exist-
ing.147
c. The Garden Variety Compromise
The garden variety48 rule arose as a compromise between the concerns
for fairness to defendants and concerns about plaintiffs' privacy. Courts do
not articulate the approach as a compromise, but there is an underlying sense
that if plaintiffs do not overreach, they should be allowed to avoid waiver.
The definition of "garden variety" is hard to pin down, but it seems guided
by judges' sense of what an "ordinary" or "normal" person might suffer as a
result of the defendant's alleged conduct.
141 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
142 Id. at 229.
143 Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Hucko v. City of Oak Forest,
185 F.R.D. 526, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Id. at 636-37.
145 Id. at 638.
146 id.
147 Id at 636, 638.
148 The term appeared in a waiver case before the Jaffee decision. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpen-
ters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding no implied waiver
where plaintiff made a claim for only garden variety mental distress, "not a claim of psychic injury or
psychiatric disorder resulting from the alleged discrimination"). See also Smith, supra note 2, at 112.
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One of the first cases after Jaffee to take the middle ground was Santelli
v. Electro-Motive.149 There, a Title VII plaintiff sought damages for "humili-
ation, embarrassment, and other similar emotions."' The court found that
these allegations were limited to those emotions "she experienced essentially
as the intrinsic result of the defendant's alleged conduct," and she was
"barred from introducing evidence of any resulting symptoms or conditions
that she might have suffered."'"' She could not introduce evidence of, for
example, "sleeplessness, nervousness, depression." 5 2 As long as she stayed
within the court's parameters for her emotional distress damages claim, she
could avoid waiver. The court found that these limitations made the privi-
leged communications no longer relevant.'I
A New York district court adopted the garden variety approach to bal-
ance the purpose of the privilege and the goals of the civil rights laws. 154 The
court noted that in many of the so-called broad view cases, it was clear the
plaintiff claimed more than garden variety emotional distress damages.' 5
These decisions were therefore consistent with a garden variety approach.
The court further noted that finding a waiver whenever the plaintiff sought
incidental emotional distress damages would be inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the privilege and contrary to the policy to allow redress for emotional
distress caused by statutory and constitutional violations.5 6 Similarly, an-
other court adopting the garden variety approach stated that "[t]o hold other-
wise would mean that privilege would be waived routinely in any case where
a plaintiff sought recompense for the ordinary pain and suffering experienced
in response to adverse employment actions that the plaintiff claims are ille-
gal."57
Concerns about routine findings of waiver even for "incidental" or "in-
trinsic" emotional distress damages seem to underlie the garden variety ap-
proach. But defining the garden has proven difficult. As one court recently
noted:
The problem in these cases is definitional and stems from the imprecision and elasticity of the
phrase "garden variety." The courts' formulations vary, but the thought they seek to convey is
the same. Garden variety emotional damages are: "the distress that any healthy, well-adjusted
person would likely feel as a result of being so victimized"; "the generalized insult, hurt feel-
ings and lingering resentment which anyone could be expected to feel" given the defendant's
conduct; the "normal distress experienced as a result of the [claimed injury]"; "the negative
149 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
150 Id. at 309.
151 id.
152 id
153 id
154 Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
155 Id. at 449.
156 Id. at 451.
157 St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 19 (D.D.C. 2011).
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emotions that [plaintiff] experienced essentially as the intrinsic result of the defendant's al-
leged conduct," but not the "resulting symptoms or conditions that she might have suffered";
the " 'generalized insult, hurt feelings, and lingering resentment that does not involve a signif-
icant disruption of the plaintiff's work life and rarely involves more than a temporary disrup-
tion of the claimant's personal life' "; the "ordinary or commonplace," "simple or usual"; those
that do not involve psychological treatment or adversely affect any " 'particular life activi-
ties' "; those where the plaintiff describes his or her distress "in vague or conclusory terms,"
but does not describe "the[ir] severity or consequences"; or those that involve the general pain
and suffering and emotional distress one feels at the time of the complained-of conduct, but
not any ongoing emotional distress."'
In 2011, a D.C. federal judge suggested a five-factor test borrowed from
the case law on whether a plaintiffs mental condition is "in controversy" for
purposes of a court-ordered mental evaluation under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 35.11 These factors are:
(1) a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) an allega-
tion of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder; (3) a claim of unusually severe emo-
tional distress; (4) plaintiff's offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress;
and/or (5) plaintiff's concession that his or her mental condition is "in controversy.""
These factors-at least the first four-are similar to those noted by the D.C.
Circuit in Koch,6t and to those noted by the New York district court in
Ruhlman v. Ulster County Department ofSocial Servicesl62 in its close read-
ing of the "broad view" cases.'63
Yetjudicial opinion is hardly uniform, and even among those who adopt
the garden variety approach, courts remain free to weed the garden as they
will.'1
II. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
A. A Critique of the Garden Variety Approach
The garden variety approach may seem like a reasonable compromise
that allows some recovery for emotional distress without a waiver of the priv-
ilege. but the approach has some insidious problems. It privileges plaintiffs
158 Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218,225-26 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (alteration in original) (footnote omit-
ted) (citations omitted).
159 St. John, 274 F.R.D. at 19.
160 Id. (quoting Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
161 489 F.3d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
162 194 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
163 Id. at 449 (noting that courts find waiver when plaintiffs assert separate claims for negligent or
intentional emotional distress, or when they claim specific or severe emotional disorders or diagnoses).
164 See, e.g., In re Consol. RNC Cases, 2009 WL 130178, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (finding a
long list of emotional distress damages, involving multiple plaintiffs, to be beyond garden variety).
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who have never sought psychotherapeutic counseling, those who were not
particularly harmed emotionally by the alleged conduct, and also those
whose allegations of mental suffering strike the district court as "normal."
The first group obviously does not need the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
while membership in the second and third groups is hard to predict since it
depends on the court's view of normal and ordinary. As more and more
Americans seek counseling, this approach is unrealistic and unworkable.
Moreover, the idea of "ordinary" emotional distress in the context of civil
rights litigation undermines the very goals of federal civil rights and mental
health legislation.
The touchstone of "ordinary," "intrinsic," or "normal" emotional harm
has no firm basis in reality. "'Garden-variety emotional distress' is a legal
term, not a psychiatric term . .. "165 It is no more than judicial intuition about
what seems to be the right amount of injury attributable to the defendant.
Judges are thus imagining what an ordinary person would experience as a
result of the statutory or constitutional violation. What basis is there for such
imaginings? Who is the reasonably mentally distressed person? Does reason-
ableness take into account differences in perception and experience that
might exist among genders and races? 66 What is the "intrinsic effect" of dis-
criminatory behavior? It is likely much more severe than judges, especially
those from privileged backgrounds, usually imagine.'6I Should the judge be
imagining the effects on a reasonable member of the protected class who has
experienced the typical amount of discrimination in the past?
What is "normal" will vary with life experiences, and the "ordinary"
effect of discrimination may be greater than judges imagine precisely be-
cause of the very wrongs against which civil rights legislation was intended.
Any concept of "normal emotional distress" needs to take into account the
cumulative impact of discrimination over a lifetime. One study showed that
day-to-day perceived discrimination was "related to the development of dis-
tress and diagnoses of generalized anxiety and depression."' 8 In a 2001 re-
port, the surgeon general concluded, "the findings indicate that racism and
discrimination are clearly stressful events. Racism and discrimination ad-
versely affect health and mental health, and they place minorities at risk for
165 Smith, supra note 2, at 112. "Few courts make any cffort to justify the vegetarian metaphor in
terms of the policy of the privilege." 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5543 (Supp. 2013).
166 See Kim L. Kim, The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 81 ILL. B.J.
404, 404 (1993).
167 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity-A Supple-
ment to Mental Health: A Report ofthe Surgeon General, NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., 25-39 (2001),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44243/pdf/rOC.pdf.
168 Id. at 38.
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mental disorders such as depression and anxiety." 6 9 It follows that the ordi-
nary, normal victim of discrimination is a figment of judicial imaginations;
it conjures up the image of a person who has never experienced discrimina-
tion but who is suddenly the victim of a discriminatory episode.
The potential conflict between the objective reasonable person standard
and the plaintiffs particular gender, race, or other circumstances has been
long litigated when determining liability for sexual harassment or hostile
workplace claims. In this context, many argue that the defendant's conduct
should be viewed from the standpoint of the reasonable woman. 70 The de-
fendant's conduct is to be viewed from both an objective and subjective per-
spective, considering the plaintiffs circumstances.'7 ' The notion of garden
variety emotional distress is in conflict with this approach toward liability-
it amounts to a yardstick based on privilege, a kind of discrimination in itself
that tells the plaintiff something is wrong with her if she claims to have suf-
fered more than what is reasonable according to the dominant group.
The concept of a "normal" amount of distress also reflects a bias against
those with emotional problems, perpetuating the stigma that still applies to
mental health patients. Yet federal policy is to eliminate bias and discrimina-
tion against those with mental disabilities, 7 2 and to destigmatize mental
health treatment.' 7 According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Agency, one of the government's goals is to reduce or eliminate
"[t]he stigma that surrounds both mental illnesses and seeking care for mental
illnesses."' 74 The garden variety approach to waiver undercuts this goal be-
cause it perpetuates the idea of what is normal or expected in a certain situa-
tion, but with no empirical basis. In many formulations of the approach, a
diagnosis takes the claim for emotional distress beyond garden variety.' 7 The
garden variety approach tells plaintiffs who have a diagnosis that their emo-
tional distress is beyond what is normal and reasonable, reinforcing bias and
the stigma of mental health treatment.
169 Id. (citation omitted). In a related vein, victims of child sexual abuse may be more susceptible to
later sexual abuse or harassment:
Recent research indicates that a number of psychosocial problems-including chronic depres-
sion and anxiety, isolation and poor social adjustment, substance abuse, suicidal behavior, and
involvement in physically or sexually abusive relationships as either aggressor or victim -are
more common among adults molested as children than among those with no such childhood
experiences. Victims of sexual abuse can suffer an impaired ability to critically evaluate the
motives and behavior of others, making them more vulnerable to revictimization.
J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 932 (N.J. 1998).
170 See generally Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pragmatic Support for the Reasonable Victim Standard
in Hostile Workplace Sexual Harassment Cases, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 519, 531 (1999).
171 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Scrys., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) ("[Tlhe objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, con-
sidering 'all the circumstances."' (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
172 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
173 See, e.g., The Federal Mental Health Action Agenda, supra note 67.
174 id
175 See, e.g., Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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Not only does the garden variety approach perpetuate bias, but it rein-
troduces the uncertainty that the Jaffe Court sought to eliminate when it said
that courts should not balance relevance and privacy. Measured by the judge
or magistrate's personal yardstick of normal emotional distress, the garden
variety standard is unknowable in advance. Predictability was exactly what
the Jaffe Court sought to establish with the psychotherapist-patient privilege:
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all."' 6 The lack of binding authority on the proper standard for implied
waiver has reintroduced uncertainty into the law of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. The garden variety approach does not reduce this uncertainty.
In part due to this uncertainty, a plaintiff who wishes to maintain the
privilege will have to avoid mention of any particular diagnosis or symptoms,
since diagnosis or particular symptoms are usually seen as indications of
more than garden variety distress. Yet as insurance coverage for mental
health treatment becomes more common, more people will receive diagno-
ses.177 Plaintiffs who have received treatment and a diagnosis must decide
whether to introduce that diagnosis or to leave it out so as to be sure to main-
tain confidentiality of their records.
In fact, the garden variety approach encourages plaintiffs to "white-
wash" and fictionalize their mental condition by leaving out important and
truthful information in order to preserve the privilege. Several cases show
how awkward this can be. In Flowers v. Owens,"' for example, the district
court denied the plaintiffs motion for a protective order because the court
was not satisfied that the plaintiff would limit his testimony to what it deemed
garden variety emotional distress. '7 The plaintiff had testified in a deposition
that he was afraid to leave his house because he was afraid he might encoun-
ter the police (defendants) who he said had beat him while he was in jail.s0
He had also said that whenever he saw any of the defendants it "[brought]
back what happened."'8 ' The court stated that such testimony sounded like
the symptoms of agoraphobia or post-traumatic stress disorder, and it also
found other parts of his testimony to go beyond garden variety emotional
distress.'82 The court concluded that the plaintiff could only maintain his priv-
ilege if he did not repeat such testimony at trial and confined himself to "the
kind of simple, usual, and ordinary emotions approved by the [garden variety
176 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
393 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177 See supra Part 1.B.2.
178 274 F.R.D. 218 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
179 Id at 229.
180 Id at 220-21.
181 Id at 221.
182 Id. at 227.
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approach] cases."' 3 The court acknowledged that the limitation might pre-
vent him from recovering the full amount of his damages but concluded the
choice was the plaintiff s whether to limit testimony or to waive the privilege
and seek full recovery.18 4
The court in Santelli v. Electro-Motive ruled similarly. As in Flowers,
the plaintiff had agreed to limit her testimony to garden variety distress in
order to maintain her privilege.'I The court stated that she could proceed as
follows:
She will be precluded at trial from introducing the fact or details of her treatment; she may not
offer evidence through any witness about symptoms or conditions that she suffered (e.g., sleep-
lessness, nervousness, depression); and she will not be permitted to offer any evidence regard-
ing a medical or psychological diagnosis. Rather, she will be permitted to testify only that she
felt humiliated, embarrassed, angry or upset because of the alleged discrimination.18 6
One wonders how these limitations on testimony might affect a plain-
tiff's credibility and demeanor as the witness struggles to stay within the gar-
den boundaries. But these plaintiffs are in a bind-if they waive the privilege
and allow the defendants to reveal the full extent of their mental health treat-
ment, they may also have credibility problems with the jury. The plaintiffs in
these, and other,'"' cases chose to maintain the privilege rather than seek full
recovery for their emotional distress.
The garden variety approach allows those who were less harmed, and
those who do not have serious psychological issues, to claim the privilege,
while forcing those who most value the privilege-those with significant
mental distress-to choose between claiming their actual damages and waiv-
ing the privilege or simply claiming an "ordinary" amount. The approach
perpetuates the stigma associated with mental health treatment and reinforces
a biased perspective, thereby undercutting important federal policies against
discrimination and bias. It creates uncertainty about privacy rights and en-
courages plaintiffs to fictionalize their mental state.
The garden variety approach creates difficulties for defendants as well.
The standard of "normal" damages is equally unknowable and unpredictable
for defendants. Moreover, even when a plaintiff's damage claims are deemed
garden variety, the jury can award up to the statutory limits, although a court
may reduce the award if it finds it excessive.' 5 Defendants thus remain at
183 Id at 229.
184 Flowers, 274 F.R.D. at 229.
185 Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 388 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). In both cases, the plaintiffs abandoned claims for emotional distress in an effort to maintain
their psychotherapist privilege.
188 See, e.g., Rainone v. Potter, 388 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (reversing an award of
$150,000 for what the trial court deemed garden variety emotional distress).
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risk for the full amount but are limited in what evidence they can discover-
the court's qualitative determination has no effect on the quantitative risk.
B. "Reason and Experience" Analysis under Rule 501
The forgoing critique shows how the garden variety approach under-
mines key policy goals of the civil rights statutes. This policy critique is also
an important consideration under a Rule 501 analysis of implied waiver un-
der Jaffee. The courts have generally not engaged in such an analysis, in the
apparent belief that implied waiver is a separate issue from that addressed in
Jaffee (whether to recognize a privilege under Rule 501). But there is an ar-
gument for following the path laid down in Jaffee: the question of implied
waiver is really about the scope of the privilege itself, and so it makes sense
to recur to the Jaffee approach to determine the contours of waiver and priv-
ilege. Such an approach entails ascertaining the public good served by the
privilege and looking to sources such as the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence as well as the laws of the states.'
As the Court said, its job under Rule 501 is to "define new privileges by
interpreting 'common law principles ... in the light of reason and experi-
ence."190 "[T]he common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions."' 9 The Court also referred to
the notion of a "public good transcending the normally predominant principle
of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."l 92
1. The Public Good: Not Just Mental Health, but Civil Rights
The Court first addressed the policy question of whether there was a
public good sufficient to justify the privilege, and it found one in promoting
mental health through confidential psychotherapy.193 As some lower courts
have noted, this same public good is implicated in the issue of implied
waiver.'94 Potential plaintiffs may not seek the help they need if there is un-
certainty about confidentiality.
189 The Court conducted a somewhat similar analysis in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980), ultimately limiting the privilege against adverse spousal testimony to the testifying spouse. There,
the Court looked at the historical foundations of the privilege, its erosion in the states, and the policy
reasons for limiting it.
190 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
191 Id (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 Id at 9 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 Id. at 2.
194 Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that broad or garden variety
approaches would introduce uncertainty to the privilege and undermine the purpose of the privilege);
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An additional public good is also implicated, however, in the context of
federal civil rights lawsuits: the vindication of civil rights through citizens
acting as "private attorneys general." 95 The civil rights lawsl9 6 exist not only
to create private rights of action but to encourage citizens to seek redress for
acts of discrimination so that all of society might benefit. Since the 1960s,
Congress has expanded civil rights protection to persons with disabilities'97
and defined sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy. 19 Congress has repeatedly demonstrated the public importance of the
statutory civil rights goals through various provisions, such as those allowing
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs,199 creating the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission with the authority to enforce employment civil
rights,2 00 and charging the Department of Housing and Urban Development
with enforcement of the fair housing laws.20' To further encourage victims to
seek relief, Congress amended the law in 1991 to allow for compensatory
damages, including emotional distress.202 The law of implied waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege directly affects the enforcement mecha-
nisms Congress has enacted.
As one district court judge put it, "To condition recovery for emotional
distress incidental to the violation of federal constitutional and statutory
rights upon the surrender of the protection of the psychotherapist privilege is
also antithetical to the purpose of the laws that provide redress for such vio-
lations."2 03 The need to further the public good of vindicating civil rights sup-
ports a narrow view of waiver.
2. The Work of the Advisory Committee
In support of its public good analysis, the Jaffee Court also looked to
the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 and the Advisory Committee's
Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Scrvs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 451 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the
broad approach to waiver would undermine the goal of facilitating successful mental health treatment).
195 A private attorney general is one who "vindicat[es] a policy that Congress considered of the high-
est priority." Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). "A civil rights
plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected a violation of federal law and, in so doing, has vin-
dicated Congress's statutory purposes." Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 (2011).
196 See supra note 50.
197 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12134 (2006).
198 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
199 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure 'effective access to the judicial
process' for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
201 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3616 (2006).
202 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2006).
203 Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445,451 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
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notes on that rule.2 04 As noted earlier, Proposed Rule 504, rejected by Con-
gress, contained the following exception:
There is no privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental
or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which
any party relics upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.205
This "patient-litigant exception" had already been established as part of
federal law and was the prevailing rule in the states-although its exact pa-
rameters had not been established. 20 6 The Jaffee Court did not mention this
exception. The Advisory Committee Notes say only that "[b]y injecting his
condition into litigation, the patient must be said to waive the privilege, in
fairness and to avoid abuses." 207 Presumably, the Advisory Committee relied
on the common law in including this exception. 208
The exception in the proposed rules was presented by the Court in 1972.
It contains no mention of civil rights litigation, and indeed, it was drafted
before several important Civil Rights amendments and statutes, including the
ADA, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and of course the 1991 Act that
allowed litigants to seek compensatory damages. It is fair to say that the draft-
ers of the rule did not consider how the patient-litigant exception would affect
the policies of those statutes. Thus, the proposed rule should carry less weight
with respect to implied waiver in civil rights cases than with respect to the
existence of the privilege in the first place.
204 The Advisory Committee's role in the development of the Rules of Evidence is as follows:
The rule-making path usually begins when the appropriate Advisory Committee prepares a
draft rule or proposed change to a rule. The committee's reporter "prepares the initial drafts of
rules changes and 'Committee Notes' explaining their purpose or intent." The Advisory Com-
mittee as a whole reviews the draft, revises it, and sends it on to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee).
The Standing Committee either accepts, rejects, or modifies the proposed rule submitted
by the Advisory Committee. If the Standing Committee approves the draft, it transmits the
proposed rule and the Advisory Committee Notes to the Judicial Conference. In turn, the Ju-
dicial Conference transmits its recommendations to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court reviews the rule changes, modifies them if it wishes, and transmits them to Congress
through an Order of the Court. Congress then has a period of time to review the rules and either
modify or reject them. If Congress does not act on the rules, they go into effect as transmitted
by the Court. This basic pattern has been followed since the passage of the Rules Enabling
Act, but was amended in 1988 to open the Advisory Committee and Standing Committee
meetings to the public, to provide for extended periods of public comment, and to provide for
a longer period of congressional review.
Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1288-90 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Thomas E. Baker,
An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 329 (1991)).
205 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1973).
206 See Poulin, supra note 39, at 1345-47.
207 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 244 (1973).
208 "The Notes disclose a purpose to adhere to the common law in the application of evidentiary
principles, absent express provisions to the contrary." Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995).
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On the other hand, the Advisory Committee's more recent efforts with
the question of waiver of the attorney-client privilege should be considered
part of the "reason and experience" analysis. 20 Federal Rule of Evidence 502
was proposed in 2007 to address confusion in the courts about the scope of
waiver resulting from disclosure of some privileged materials. 210 Some courts
held that any disclosure, whether intentional or inadvertent, waived the priv-
ilege with respect to the entire subject matter of the disclosed material. The
rule makes clear that
a voluntary disclosure in a federal proceeding . .. if a waiver, generally results in a waiver only
of the communication or information disclosed; a subject matter waiver . . . is reserved for
those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected
information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the
disadvantage of the adversary. 211
The rule also provides a route for a party to rectify an inadvertent disclo-
sure.2 12
Rule 502 was prompted in part by complaints about the additional liti-
gation costs to parties trying to maintain the attorney-client privilege, and by
the need for certainty about the scope of the privilege and waiver.213 The rule
deals only with waiver through disclosure and does not affect other common
law waiver doctrines-such as waiver by asserting an "advice of counsel"
defense, or the waiver that accompanies an allegation of malpractice. 214 Nev-
ertheless, the rule supports the idea that the scope of waiver can be a proper
subject for a rule or statute, and that expense, confusion, and uncertainty are
reasons for such codification.
3. The Experience of the States
After considering the proposed rule and Advisory Committee Notes, the
Jaffee Court consulted the laws of the fifty states. The Court noted, "Because
state legislatures are fully aware of the need to protect the integrity of the
209 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note.
211 Id.
212 FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
213 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note.
214 "Other common-law waiver doctrines may result in a finding of waiver even where there is no
disclosure of privileged information or work product." Id. See also Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200,
205 (5th Cir. 1999) (reliance on an advice-of-counsel defense waives the privilege with respect to attor-
ney-client communications pertinent to that defense); Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 440 (D.D.C.
1983) (allegation of lawyer malpractice constituted a waiver of confidential communications under the
circumstances). "The rule is not intended to displace or modify federal common law concerning waiver
of privilege or work product where no disclosure has been made." FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's
note.
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factfinding functions of their courts, the existence of a consensus among the
States indicates that 'reason and experience' support recognition of the priv-
ilege." 215 All of the states had recognized the privilege by the time of Jaffee,
although the laws varied in scope. 216
Similarly, almost every state recognizes some kind of implied waiver.
But, unfortunately, there is no clear state consensus on the approach to im-
plied waiver, just as there is none among the federal courts. The great major-
ity of states have a patient-litigant exception of some sort, usually statutory.
While many model their statutory exception on Proposed Rule 504(d)(3), an
equal number have their own variation.217 A sizable minority have statutes
that put the psychotherapist privilege on the same footing as the attorney-
client privilege. 218
Many states have no published judicial interpretation of their statutes.
State trial courts, unlike federal trial courts, generally do not publish their
decisions-thus we do not know whether the issue arises as frequently in
state trial courts as it does in federal district courts. But it appears that, just
as in the federal system, state implied waiver issues rarely reach the appellate
level. Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at the various state approaches. 219
Fifteen states have created statutory exceptions to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege based on the language of Proposed Rule 504(d)(3). 220 Most
of these states have no binding judicial interpretation of the exception, so
litigants in those states cannot be sure what it means to "rel[y] upon a condi-
tion as an element of [a] claim or defense." The Hawaii Intermediate Court
of Appeals has made it clear, however, that more than relevance is required,
and that the condition must be significant: "In this context, 'mental or emo-
tional condition' means something that requires 'diagnosis or treatment."' 221
A similar number of states have patient-litigant exceptions that differ
somewhat from the proposed rule. For example, the Rhode Island statute de-
fines "mental condition" as "including, but not limited to, any allegation of
mental anguish, mental suffering or similar condition ... provided ... that a
claim for damages or other relief for 'pain and suffering' [is] based solely on
215 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996).
216 Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent that of those states that have some sort of privilege, "the
diversity is vast." Id at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 See Smith, supra note 2, at 97 n.98.
218 Id. at 108.
219 I've confined this analysis to exceptions relevant to the issue of implied waiver in torts and civil
rights cases. Many states have codified additional exceptions for family, criminal, and civil commitment
cases. Those exceptions are beyond the scope of this Article.
220 ALASKA R. EVID. 504; ARK. R. EVID. 503; DEL. R. EVID. 503; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(4)(c)
(West 2006); IDAHO R. EVID. 503; ME. R. EVID. 503; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1750 (LexisNexis
2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-504 (2007); N.M. R. EVID. 11-504; N.D. R. EVID. 503; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.230 (1999); UTAH R. EVID. 506; VT. R. EVID. 503; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 2010).
221 Sussman v. Sussman, 146 P.3d 597, 603 (Haw. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a wife did not waive
the privilege simply by seeking custody so that her mental condition became relevant).
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one's physical condition."2 22 Oklahoma's statute modifies the proposed fed-
eral exception by providing that the privilege is "qualified," rather than elim-
inated, when the patient relies on his mental condition as an element of a
claim or defense.223
A handful of state statutes refer explicitly to findings by the judge. The
relevant Connecticut statute says that communications are not privileged if
the patient "introduces his psychological condition as an element of his claim
or defense" and "the judge finds that it is more important to the interests of
justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship be-
tween the person and psychologist be protected." 224 Massachusetts' statute is
similar. 225 On the other hand, Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina
statutes appear to give the judge discretion to order disclosure even where
the client's mental condition is not an element of a claim or defense. 226
Some states seem to take a broad approach to the question of implied
waiver. The Kentucky Supreme Court, for example, held that a claim for
"mental pain" was sufficient to waive the privilege. 227 Similarly, Louisiana
plaintiffs in a wrongful death case were deemed to have waived the privilege
simply by seeking "mental anguish damages." 228 A Washington appellate
court recently held that a plaintiff seeking damages for emotional harm aris-
ing from an employment discrimination claim had waived the privilege even
though he did not plan to offer a specific diagnosis or expert testimony. 229
Some states have indicated that the issue of implied waiver should be
approached narrowly. The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting that the statute
equated the psychotherapist-patient privilege with the attorney-client privi-
lege, has adopted a three-part test to determine the scope of implied waiver
222 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.3-6(B)(1) (WEST 2013).
223 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West 2013).
224 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c(c)(2) (West 2013).
225 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(d) (West 2000).
226 Virginia law states,
[W]hen the physical or mental condition of the client is at issue in such action, or when a court,
in the exercise of sound discretion, deems such disclosure necessary to the proper administra-
tion ofjustice, no fact communicated to, or otherwise learned by, such practitioner in connec-
tion with such counseling, treatment or advice shall be privileged, and disclosure may be re-
quired.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (West 2001). In West Virginia, disclosure of privileged material may be
required "[p]ursuant to an order of any court based upon a finding that the information is sufficiently
relevant to a proceeding before the court to outweigh the importance of maintaining the confidentiality
established by this section." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1 (b)(3) (LexisNexis 2008). In North Carolina, the
law provides that "[a]ny resident or presiding judge in the district in which the action is pending may,
subject to G.S. 8-53.6, compel disclosure, either at the trial or prior thereto, if in his or her opinion disclo-
sure is necessary to a proper administration ofjustice." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-53.3 (West 2013).
227 Dudley v. Stevens, 338 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Ky. 2011).
228 Prine v. Bailey, 964 So. 2d 435, 443 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
229 Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 292 P.3d 779, 790-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). The court cited
Oberweis and Fitzgerald and analogized the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the doctor-patient privi-
lege, which under state law is waived by filing suit for physical injury.
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and requires in camera review before the material is released. 23 0 In Arizona,
where the statute also analogizes to the attorney-client privilege, a court of
appeals similarly has emphasized the limited scope of an implied waiver and
the propriety of in camera review.23 1 The Supreme Court of Alabama was
unwilling to adopt a patient-litigant exception where the statute contained
none: "[w]e hold that by merely alleging mental anguish and emotional dis-
tress the plaintiffs in these cases have not waived the psychotherapist-patient
privilege... ."232 And California's Supreme Court has interpreted broad stat-
utory language 233 quite narrowly:
In light of these considerations, the "automatic" waiver of privilege contemplated by section
1016 must be construed not as a complete waiver of the privilege but only as a limited waiver
concomitant with the purposes of the exception. Under section 1016 disclosure can be com-
pelled only with respect to those mental conditions the patient-litigant has "disclose[d] * * * by
bringing an action in which they are in issue"; communications which are not directly relevant
to those specific conditions do not fall within the terms of section 1016's exception and there-
fore remain privileged. Disclosure cannot be compelled with respect to other aspects of the
patient-litigant's personality even though they may, in some sense, be "relevant" to the sub-
stantive issues of litigation. The patient thus is not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek
redress for a specific mental or emotional injury; the scope of the inquiry permitted depends
upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant himself has brought before the court.234
Finally, there are states that seem to take the middle-ground, or garden
variety, approach. The reasoning of a Colorado court is similar to that seen
in the federal cases:
[The plaintiff| has not made any independent tort claims for either intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress, in which the question of liability would turn on her mental
condition and the cause of it. She did not seek counseling for any emotional issues related to
the accident. She does not seek compensation for the expenses incurred in obtaining either
psychiatric counseling or marriage counseling. And finally, she does not plan to call any expert
witnesses to testify about her mental suffering. Under these circumstances, we hold that bare
allegations of mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of
life are insufficient to inject a plaintiffs mental condition into a case as the basis for a claim
where the mental suffering alleged is incident to the plaintiffs physical injuries and does not
exceed the suffering and loss an ordinary person would likely experience in similar circum-
stances. Here, the mental suffering for which [plaintiff] claims damages is incident to her phys-
ical injuries and does not exceed the suffering and loss an ordinary person would likely expe-
230 Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 569-70 (N.J. 1997).
231 Blazek v. Superior Court, 869 P.2d 509, 515-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
232 Exparte W. Mental Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835, 841 (Ala. 2003).
233 "There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning
the mental or emotional condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by: (a) The patient; [or]
(b) Any party claiming through or under the patient ..... CAL. EVID. CODE § 1016 (West 2009).
234 In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 570 (Cal. 1970) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
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rience in similar circumstances. Thus, the trial court may not find an implied waiver of [plain-
tiff's] physician-patient or psychotherapist-client privileges based on the fact that she has made
these claims for mental suffering damages.235
Missouri has taken a similar approach, holding that "[a] person claiming
emotional distress damages for sex discrimination and sexual harassment"
retains the privilege where "her claim is only for such emotional distress and
humiliation that an ordinary person would experience under the circum-
stances or that may be inferred from the circumstances, and . . . is not to be
supported by any evidence of medical or psychological treatment for a diag-
nosable condition."23 6 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Texas have also
applied what appears to be the garden variety approach.237 These courts, like
their federal counterparts, rely on concepts of "generic," normal, or ordinary
mental distress.
The lack of state consensus on the approach to implied waiver illustrates
how strong the arguments are on every side of the debate between fairness to
defendants, privacy, and vindication of civil rights. Although almost all states
recognize some kind of implied waiver, they do not speak with one voice on
its definition or scope. Unlike in the federal system, we cannot know what
the trends are in the state trial courts, and not all states have appellate deci-
sions in this area.
Thus, a "reason and experience" analysis suggested by Jaffee gives us
no conclusive answer on the question of implied waiver of the privilege. Alt-
hough such an analysis helps identify an additional public good in the context
of civil rights litigation, the Advisory Committee's experience, and that of
the states, is mixed-reflecting the continuing conflict between privacy
rights and fairness.
Perhaps one lesson from this analysis, however, is that waiver is a
proper subject for statute or court rule. Only a few states leave it entirely up
to a judge to balance competing interests.23 8 Thus, with a statute, and perhaps
a controlling court decision interpreting the statute, some state litigants have
a measure of certainty about the waiver question-a certainty that federal
litigants lack. The experience with Rule 502 governing waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege also supports a legislative solution where the federal
courts are in disagreement.
235 Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1999) (en banc).
236 State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 569 (Mo. 2006) (en bane).
237 See Sorenson v. H & R Block, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 199, 204 (D. Mass. 2000) (applying Massachu-
setts law); Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 903 A.2d 952, 959 (N.H. 2006) (finding no implied waiver with
a claim for 'generic' mental suffering that is incident to physical injury"); In re Whipple, 373 S.W.3d
119, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) ("A routine allegation of mental anguish does not place a party's mental
condition in controversy. 'The plaintiff must assert a mental injury that exceeds the common emotional
reaction to an injury or loss."' (citation omitted) (quoting Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 753
(Tex. 1988))).
238 See supra note 226.
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III. A LEGISLATIVE OPTION
But what form should a legislative solution take? The most practical
solution is to codify the garden variety compromise, without the uncertainty
and bias of the judicial version.
A defense advocate might respond to the criticisms of a judicial garden
variety approach by saying that if a plaintiff is unhappy with the compromise
that conditions the privilege on forgoing more extensive damages, the plain-
tiff should be prepared to waive the privilege and reveal all; waiver is simply
the price for seeking extensive damages. But by linking the privilege to the
extent of the damages claimed, this argument incorporates a balancing of in-
terests that the Jaffe Court rejected when it established the privilege.
Yet although the garden variety compromise appears inconsistent with
Jaffee's approach to the privilege, there is something to the related concerns
about fairness to defendants, and to tying that concern to the level of damages
sought. Civil rights statutes require proof of actual damages,239 and how is a
defendant to rebut a plaintiffs claims--especially claims of extreme emo-
tional distress-without access to relevant evidence? Are not treatment rec-
ords also relevant to causation? For these reasons, some commentators have
embraced a balancing approach to the question of waiver, albeit with stricter
adherence to the law of privilege and discovery than what many courts have
shown.2 40
For example, Beth Frank, focusing on sexual harassment lawsuits under
Title VII, notes that Congress has asserted a strong federal policy of protect-
ing sexual harassment victims' privacy interests. 241 She also emphasizes that
Title VII was not intended to provide a tort remedy, but rather to vindicate
civil rights by private attorneys general. 242 She therefore advocates a balanc-
ing approach much like many courts' formulations of the garden variety the-
ory of waiver. 243 She suggests that courts only find waiver of the psychother-
apist privilege by sexual harassment plaintiffs if the plaintiff introduces a
portion of her mental health records or the testimony of her treating psycho-
therapist, or brings additional tort claims such as negligent or intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.244
Professor Deirdre Smith persuasively advocates an exacting application
of privilege and waiver law under which the judge steers a careful course
through Rule 26's discovery limitations, the definition of privileged commu-
nication, and waiver as determined by the plaintiffs affirmative acts.24 5 She
239 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
240 Smith, supra note 2, at 100; Frank, supra note 2, at 649 nn.70-71 and accompanying text.
241 Frank, supra note 2, at 641.
242 Id. at 662-64.
243 Id. at 666-68.
244 Id. at 662-64.
245 Smith, supra note 2, at 140-50.
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notes that many courts oversimplify the inquiry; they find an implied waiver
makes all of the plaintiffs psychotherapeutic records fair game for discov-
ery.2 46 She emphasizes that Rule 26 allows courts to limit discovery on
grounds of relevance, privacy, embarrassment, and burden.2 47 She also argues
that courts should pay careful attention to the scope of the privilege; 248 a
waiver as to some communications does not necessarily open all of the ther-
apist's files and notes to inspection. Finally, she reminds us that while the
burden to show the privilege may be on the party asserting it, the burden to
show waiver should rest on the defendant.249 Waiver should be determined
by the plaintiffs affirmative acts rather than changing concerns of relevance
or fairness. 250 Thus, she would find waiver where the plaintiff seeks to re-
cover payment for mental health treatment or lists a mental health care pro-
vider as a witness-but such waiver would be limited to communication di-
rectly related to the waiver. 251 The plaintiff seeking to recover costs of treat-
ment, for example, would waive the privilege as to communications about
that cost such as "billing, treatment plan, diagnostic impression, and similar
documents," but not treatment notes. 252
Smith's proposal is sound and, if followed, would go far to protect plain-
tiffs' privacy and defendants' interests in fairness. It also has the benefit of
being entirely consistent with the existing law of privilege and discovery, and
in some senses it provides the compromise between privacy and fairness that
underlies the garden variety approach. But because of its nuance, her pro-
posal does not necessarily provide litigants with the certainty they need to
avoid endless litigation of the waiver question. 253
A legislative solution could eliminate much of this uncertainty: allow
plaintiffs to select a lower limit on emotional distress damages in exchange
for maintaining the privilege. Plaintiffs could then choose between seeking
significant, actual damages-which would probably require a waiver of the
privilege-and asking for only a modest amount, with no waiver. Such a so-
lution would have to be accomplished by Congress through an amendment
to the civil rights laws. In effect, it would be the garden variety compromise,
but with predictability for both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs would re-
gain control over the question of waiver, and defendants would know that if
there was no waiver, they had less to risk.
246 Id at 82.
247 Id at 140.
248 Id. at ll4-16.
249 Id. at 145.
250 Id. at 146.
251 Smith, supra note 2, at 146.
252 id.
253 Another proposal, that trial courts simply review all the psychotherapeutic records in camera and
determine what should be disclosed, is similarly unpredictable in its results. It would also require signifi-
cant judicial and litigant resources. Furthermore, the danger of an unintentional invasion of privacy is
great in an era of electronic records and email communication.
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Tying the waiver to the dollar amount of damages sought, rather than a
vague idea of what is "normal," would also bring more predictability for both
parties. At present, a jury may award any dollar amount within the statutory
limits even for garden variety emotional distress, although a court may re-
duce the award if it finds it excessive.254
Giving plaintiffs the option of preserving the privilege by seeking a set
lesser amount would let plaintiffs return the focus of litigation to the alleged
misconduct, rather than the plaintiff s actual mental condition. It makes sense
to offer plaintiffs what is basically a set penalty for that conduct, a penalty
that would not require waiver of the privilege or even a more than cursory
assertion of distress. Such an alternative would also be consistent with the
purpose of the civil rights laws, which is to create incentives for plaintiffs to
combat discrimination and to act as "private attorneys general." 255
There is precedent for the option to seek lower damages that need not
be proved. At common law, such "moderate" or "temperate" damages were
permitted for certain torts such as defamation or wrongful dishonor of a
check.25 6 "If the plaintiff be able, he may show special damage, but if he be
not able, the jury may give such temperate damages as they may conceive to
be a reasonable compensation for the injury which he must have sustained .
. . ."257 Temperate damages are more than nominal damages but must be rea-
sonable. 258 Congress could reasonably conclude that for many plaintiffs the
price in privacy lost is too great for them to seek actual emotional distress
damages. Congress could fix the amount of moderate damages at what seems
reasonable in light of the discriminatory violation, and plaintiffs could
choose to accept that amount or seek a higher amount in actual damages.
Some limitations would continue to apply. Even where plaintiffs seek
actual damages, defendants would not be entitled to blanket access to the
254 See, e.g., Rainone v. Potter, 388 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (reversing an award of
$150,000 for what the trial court deemed garden variety emotional distress).
255 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (1991). "When a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation,
we have stated, he serves 'as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered
of the highest priority."' Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (quoting Newman v. Piggic Park
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)).
256 The term "actual damages proved"
was used to negate the presumption of damage, which in defamation cases allows the trier of
fact to award "temperate damages" of a "substantial amount" because the fact finder can "in-
fer" that such damages were suffered. Our English cousins, in early cases, distinguished be-
tween such damages, and damages supported by quantifiable proof as having been actually
suffered.
5 wILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, J. FAIRFAX LEARY, JR. & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES § 4-402:8 (1999).
257 Columbia Nat'l Bank v. MacKnight, 29 App. D.C. 580, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1907).
258 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 26 (2003) ("Temperate damages are allowed without proof of actual
or special damage, where the wrong done must in fact have caused actual damage to the plaintiff, though,
from the nature of the case, he cannot fumish independent, distinct proof thereof. Temperate damages are
more than nominal damages, but are such as would be a reasonable compensation for the injury sustained."
(footnotes omitted)).
154 [VOt. 2 1:1
PRIVACY AND "GARDEN VARIETY" EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
plaintiffs records. Even where there is a waiver or partial waiver, courts
should limit the scope of discovery to material that could lead to relevant,
admissible evidence. The careful approach advocated by Smith makes sense,
and the moderate damages option could be a supplement to her proposal. A
plaintiff who seeks only the lower amount could testify about her condition
and symptoms, but the court could find waiver of some communications if
she introduces privileged material or witnesses.259 Plaintiffs seeking the lower
amount would not need to introduce evidence of actual symptoms and dis-
tress, but they may wish to do so in order to persuade the jury of the serious-
ness of the alleged discrimination. A statutory amendment permitting mod-
erate damages would allow plaintiffs to make this strategic choice without
uncertainty as to the privilege.260
The advantage of such a legislative compromise would be to take the
uncertainty out of the waiver question and accomplish the policy goals of
protecting privacy while still providing fairness to defendants when signifi-
cant money is at stake. It would be a compromise, not perfect justice. Plain-
tiffs might prefer that Congress impose the narrow view of waiver, while
defendants would seek imposition of the broad view. But a legislative com-
promise like the one here proposed would be an improvement over the cur-
rent state of affairs with no binding law on waiver, significant disagreement
among the federal courts, and an emerging dominant standard with little basis
in law or reality. It also has the advantage of taking up far less judicial time
than is currently spent on discovery motions related to the privilege.
Proposing such an amendment may be no more realistic than urging the
courts to follow a particular view of implied waiver. But it is useful to think
about such an idea. At the least, it helps to articulate the motivations behind
the garden variety compromise and separate the ideas of what seems an ap-
propriate consequence of the defendant's alleged conduct, plaintiffs actual
emotional distress damages, and the scope of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. At present, these ideas are all tangled up in the district court ap-
proaches to implied waiver.
CONCLUSION
Federal litigants cannot predict how a court will rule on the issue of
implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. There is no clear
law; appellate courts have provided only dicta, and district courts are divided.
259 Along the lines of Federal Rule of Evidence 502, the statute could provide that where plaintiffs
seek the lower amount, waiver by disclosure is limited to the material disclosed and does not waive the
privilege for all material relevant to the subject matter of the disclosed material.
260 It is beyond the scope of this Article to propose a rule for waiver of the privilege which could
apply more broadly to all types of litigation, not just civil rights cases. Such an effort would be something
for the Advisory Committee to explore. Other types of litigation could involve very different policy and
efficiency considerations.
2013] 155
GEO. MASON L. REv.
A compromise approach, which allows plaintiffs to avoid waiver if they
claim no more than garden variety mental distress, seems to be gaining pop-
ularity. But this approach does little to remove uncertainty for litigants, since
courts vary in their view of what is ordinary, garden variety mental distress.
In addition, the garden variety rule reinforces bias against those who seek
mental health treatment and imposes an idea of what is "normal" that has no
scientific basis. In fact, the concept of a "normal" amount of mental distress
in the context of civil rights violations is troublesome. The concept itself ap-
pears to be a form of discrimination.
The compromise struck by the garden variety approach between the
rights of defendants and the rights of plaintiffs could be better achieved with
a statutory amendment allowing plaintiffs to seek moderate damages without
a waiver. Plaintiffs who wish to seek actual damages in a higher amount
could do so, although they would have to waive the psychotherapist privilege
subject to the requirements of relevance and discovery rules. But plaintiffs
who seek lower, moderate damages would retain control over their privacy.
Such an approach would save judicial and litigant resources and reintroduce
some certainty into civil rights litigation.
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